1278
From John Lees
K. Stewart (R.) 2d Marquis of Londonderry

THE

# SPEECH

OF THE

RIGHT HONORABLE

## LORD VISCOUNT CASTLEREAGH,

UPON DELIVERING TO THE

HOUSE OF COMMONS OF IRELAND

HIS EXCELLENCY THE

## LORD LIEUTENANT's MESSAGE

ON THE SUBJECT OF AN

*INCORPORATING UNION WITH GREAT BRITAIN,*

WITH THE RESOLUTIONS;

CONTAINING THE TERMS ON WHICH IT IS PROPOSED TO CARRY THAT MEASURE INTO EFFECT.

*FEBRUARY* 5, 1800.

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1800.

BRITISH MUSEUM

# HOUSE OF COMMONS.

## WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 1800.

THE Houſe having met purſuant to adjournment, the Right Hon. Lord CASTLEREAGH delivered to the Houſe a Meſſage from his Excellency the LORD LIEUTENANT, it was read by the SPEAKER from the Chair, and is as follows:

" *CORNWALLIS.*

" At the cloſe of the laſt ſeſſion, in obedience to the particular " commands which I received from his Majeſty, I acquainted this " Parliament that a joint Addreſs of the two Houſes of Parliament of " Great Britain had been laid before his Majeſty, accompanied by re- " ſolutions propoſing and recommending a complete and entire Union " between Great Britain and Ireland, to be eſtabliſhed by the mutual " conſent of both Parliaments, founded on equal and liberal prin- " ciples, on the ſimilarity of laws, conſtitution and government, and on a ſenſe of mutual intereſts and affections.

" I have it now further in command from his Majeſty to lay thoſe " reſolutions before this Houſe, and ſolemnly to recommend to the " conſideration of his faithful Commons the great objects they embrace.

" His Majeſty has obſerved with increaſing ſatisfaction that the " ſentiments which have continued to be manifeſted in favour of " this important and ſalutary meaſure, by ſuch numerous and re- " ſpectable deſcriptions of his Iriſh ſubjects, confirm the hope he " has expreſſed, that its accompliſhment will prove to be as much " the joint wiſh as it unqueſtionably is the common intereſt of " both his kingdoms, an event to which his Majeſty looks forward " with the utmoſt earneſtneſs, as the only means by which the com- " mon intereſts of all his People can be indiſſolubly united, and their " ſecurity and happineſs can be permanently eſtabliſhed.

" His Majeſty therefore relies on the wiſdom of his Parliaments, " and the loyal concurrence of his People for the completion of " this great Work, with a firm perſuaſion that a full and unre- " ſerved participation of conſtitutional and commercial advantages " will augment and perpetuate the proſperity of his Subjects of " his united Kingdom, and that under the favour of Divine Provi " dence the Freedom and Power of the Britiſh Empire will be eſta- " bliſhed on a foundation not to be ſhaken by the efforts either of its " foreign or domeſtic enemies. " C."

The Meſſage being read from the Chair,

Lord CASTLEREAGH ſaid: Mr. Speaker, e'er I ſubmit any motion upon the great and momentous ſubject communicated in his Excellency's meſſage, I feel it my duty to put you in full poſſeſſion of the exact views of the Engliſh and Iriſh Governments, and to lay before you all thoſe details it has been found neceſſary to inveſtigate, in order to arrive at a juſt arrangement of the meaſure which I ſhall ſubmit to the Houſe. Upon entering into this detail, at once ſo extenſive and important—important to all the intereſts of this country, to the reſtoration of its tranquillity, and to the ſecurity of our connexion with Great Britain, I find it neceſſary to throw myſelf upon the indulgence of the Houſe, for a larger portion of their attention and patience than I have ever before preſumed to ſolicit, and which the weak ſtate of my health, from recent indiſpoſition, obliges me to require.

Before I enter into the general queſtion, I muſt requeſt leave to make a few obſervations upon that topic, to which the attention of this Houſe has been ſo anxiouſly and repeatedly called in the preſent ſeſſion—I mean, the expreſſion of the public ſentiment. By the Britiſh conſtitution, the deliberative power of the ſtate is ſolely and excluſively placed in parliament; and, although parliament would act unwiſely, were it not to conſult in ſome meaſure, for the guidance of its councils, the great majority of thoſe, whoſe ſtake in the property and the intereſts of the country give them a fair claim to due conſideration; yet, parliament would be equally unwiſe, were it to ſuffer any temporary and artificial clamour, to divert them from the firſt of all its duties, that of deliberating ſolemnly, and deciding impartially on the meaſures which affect the intereſts of the country.

Laſt year, when it was wiſhed that this great queſtion ſhould be put into a ſtate of deliberation and enquiry, ſuch was the ſudden and unreaſonable clamour which was made againſt it, that it was not even allowed to be diſcuſſed. The meaſure was withdrawn; and Government felt it their duty to declare, that they would not again bring it forward until its introduction ſhould be juſtified by public ſentiment. Government felt that the reſiſtance which was made to the queſtion, was from ignorance of its nature, and miſrepreſentation of its effects. They acquieſced in delay, that time might be given for underſtanding the ſubject; and the event has juſtified their expectations. The queſtion, in proportion as it has been enquired into, and better underſtood, became more and more popular with thoſe perſons, who were moſt intereſted in the welfare of the country. The great body of the landed property in Ireland, became friendly to the principle: the property of thoſe, who have declared in favour of it in the two Houſes of Parliament, is in compariſon with thoſe who oppoſe it, nearly in the proportion of three to one; nineteen counties, whoſe ſuperficial contents form five-ſeventhſ of the iſland, have come forward in its ſupport. I do not mean to aſſert, that theſe counties are unanimous in approving the meaſure. Complete and perfect unanimity is not to be hoped for upon any great political queſtion; but I can venture to aſſert, that a very great proportion of the property in thoſe counties decidedly favours it; moſt of the great commercial towns in the kingdom, have alſo declared in its favour. When I ſpeak, Sir, of Dublin, I beg to be underſtood as ſpeaking of it with that high reſpect, which the zeal and loyalty of its inhabitants conſpicuouſly diſplayed in the trying circumſtances of the late rebellion, ſo fully demand; but I cannot

cannot help obſerving, that they ſeem at preſent to be affected with the ſame unreaſonable apprehenſions and alarms, which were felt by the citizens of Edinburgh at the time of the Union with Scotland. Thoſe apprehenſions, thoſe alarms, have been proved to be ideal and unfounded; and, I truſt, that the citizens of Dublin will live to change their fears into ſatisfaction; and, like the citizens of Edinburgh, have cauſe to be thankful to Providence for the accompliſhment of an Union with Great Britain; and grateful to thoſe who ſhall aſſiſt in its completion.

I acknowledge, Sir, that ſome counties have manifeſted a diſpoſition adverſe to this meaſure; but this circumſtance does not affect me with ſurprize, as it is known that their ſentiments have been greatly influenced by the exertions and the connexions of the Gentlemen on the other ſide of the Houſe; nor, Sir, is it to be wondered at, that much oppoſition ſhould have recently broke forth in ſome parts of the country, when we advert to the new political phenomenon which has appeared in this metropolis ſince the laſt debate. We have ſeen, Sir, a part of the Minority not ſatisfied with exerciſing their deliberative powers within theſe walls, but organizing themſelves in another place, and empowering certain perſons to ſend their letters miſſive through the country, and eſtabliſhing agents in the different counties, to bring the maſs of the people to the Bar of this Houſe, as petitioners againſt the meaſure of Union. From my knowledge of the characters of many of theſe Gentlemen, who conſtitute this new authority, I am induced to believe that they never entertained an intention of employing popular interference to intimidate Parliament; and I am equally convinced, that if ſuch an intention had exiſted, the Commons of Ireland would not yield their independence to any ſuch deſperate

perate attempt. But I am ſorry to ſay, that ſome of the agents of thoſe Gentlemen, ſome of thoſe perſons who have been employed to diſſeminate their letters miſſive through the country, have gone forth with the moſt unwarrantable pretences, and adopted the moſt treacherous artifices, and the moſt ludicrous miſrepreſentations to deceive and diſtract the populace, whoſe ſignatures againſt an Union they wiſhed to obtain. Every one knows the ignorance of the lower claſſes in this kingdom, and how eaſily they may be miſled by the moſt ſhallow and pitiful miſrepreſentations. In a county of the North, with which I have the honor of being connected, it has been given out by theſe agents, that the Union was a project of Mr. Pitt, by which he might lay a tax of five ſhillings on every wheel, and ten ſhillings on every loom. In another place, the tenantry were told, that an Union would put an end to all their leaſes; and, as the great proportion of the landed intereſt in the County of Down ſupported the meaſure, this circumſtance was urged to the tenantry as a proof of their aſſertion. "Do you not ſee," they ſaid, "that the landlords are all for the meaſure? and is not that a demonſtration that it will break your leaſes?" Such are the wretched deceptions and paltry practices reſorted to, in order to miſlead the lower claſſes, and to obtain ſucceſs in ſoliciting the petitions that had been produced to the Houſes. So far, Sir, from being ſtruck with their number, when I reflect upon the ſituation of the country, and the practices of the agents who have been employed, I am only ſurpriſed that they are not more numerous. But what, Sir, was the caſe on the Scotch Union? The table of the parliament was, day after day, for the ſpace of three months, covered with ſuch petitions; but the Scotch Parliament acted, as I truſt the Iriſh Parliament will act; they conſidered only

only the advantage of the country, and ſteadily purſuing that object, neither miſled by artifices, nor intimidated by tumult, they received, in the gratitude of their country that reward which amply compenſated for their arduous labours in the great work they ſo happily accompliſhed. I hope the Houſe will, on the preſent occaſion, behave with ſimilar fortitude, and unſeduced by party, and unawed by clamour, they will ſteadily look to the real merits of the meaſure, will ſteadily attend to the ſound and informed part of the community, looking to a compenſation for their toils in the tranquillity and happineſs of their country, and in the gratitude and praiſes of poſterity.

Having thus, Sir, adverted to the ſtate of the public ſentiment, it is natural for me to enter into the general principle of the queſtion of Union? This point, however, has been ſo fully, ſo frequently, and ſo ably diſcuſſed, both in this Houſe and in various publications, that I feel it unneceſſary to dwell further upon it than may be incidentally uſeful to ſupport the various parts of my argument. In particular, it has been inveſtigated with ſuch depth of argument, and ſuch ſound ability, by an honourable and learned friend of mine (Mr. Smith) in the ſpeech which he laſt year delivered within theſe walls, and has ſince communicated to the public, that I conſider the general principle be placed beyond queſtion or diſpute. I ſhall, therefore, proceed to lay before the Houſe the method of proceeding which it is intended to adopt. If the Parliament, Sir, had in the laſt ſeſſion entertained the diſcuſſion of this meaſure, and allowed it to be put in progreſs, it was my intention to have followed the form of proceedings purſued in the Union with Scotland; and to have propoſed to enable his Majeſty by bill to appoint Commiſſioners, to treat of and digeſt articles

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of Union, in concert with other Commiſſioners to be appointed on the part of Great Britain. This plan having been prevented by the refuſal of the Houſe, to allow a diſcuſſion of the queſtion, it became his Majeſty's Miniſters to adopt meaſures which might defeat the miſrepreſentations which had been circulated reſpecting their intentions and ſhould unfold to this kingdom the liberal diſpoſition of Great Britain. For this purpoſe his Majeſty's Miniſters introduced into the Britiſh Parliament a ſet of reſolutions containing the leading principles of the arrangement. Theſe, after a full diſcuſſion, have been almoſt unanimouſly adopted, have been tranſmitted to our common Sovereign by a joint addreſs, and are now communicated to this Parliament by his Majeſty's command. Theſe reſolutions form merely the general principles of the meaſure of Union; I ſhall, therefore, only conſider them as a baſis for other reſolutions of a more extended nature, which will ſet forth thoſe principles in detail, and ultimately form the articles of Union.

Theſe reſolutions I now hold in my hand, but I ſhall do no more this night than lay them before the Houſe, giving time to every Gentleman fully to conſider and examine them before any queſtion ſhall be put upon them; with this view, it is my intention to move, that his Majeſty's Meſſage ſhould be referred to a Committee of the whole Houſe on this day ſe'nnight, when the Committee will have the aſſiſtance, and advantage, Sir, of your abilities in debate; and in the mean time I ſhall print and circulate the deferred Reſolutions for the information of the Houſe.

Let us then look, Sir, what will be the reſult of this proceeding: Great Britain will have ſaid to Ireland, we are willing to unite with you upon the principles we have adopted, and which we conſider

highly advantageous to your intereſts; Ireland will adopt thoſe principles, and propoſe Reſolutions, which ſhall contain the application of them in detail; and if theſe ſhall be agreed to by the reſpective Parliaments, they will be carried into execution, and ſolemnly ratified by acts of the two Legiſlatures, confirming and concluding the whole proceeding.

Having now ſtated the form of proceeding, I ſhall lay before the Houſe the ſubſtance of thoſe articles, which I intend to ſubmit for their conſideration.

The firſt reſolution which I ſhall propoſe, will contain the general principle alone, and will be ſimilar in purport and tenor to the firſt reſolution of the Britiſh Parliament. If this ſhall be agreed upon, I ſhall move the articles which will conſtitute the Treaty of Union between the two kingdoms.

The firſt article will declare the Union of the two Kingdoms and the two Crowns.

The ſecond, will recognize the ſucceſſion to the Crown, as now by law eſtabliſhed.

The third will declare, that the United Kingdom ſhall be repreſented in one and the ſame Parliament.

Theſe three articles will aſcertain the future Conſtitution of the Executive Power.

I conſider, Sir, that the great and fundamental object of this arrangement, is the eſtabliſhment of the complete identity of the Executive Power in every poſſibility of circumſtance, and in every application of authority. It will be ſaid, that this object is already aſcertained by the act of Annexation, and that any further proviſion on the ſubject is uſeleſs and unneceſſary. No one, Sir, can entertain a higher veneration for the act of Annexation than myſelf; and, if I had been in Parliament at an earlier period I ſhould have felt it my duty to have acted up to the full meaning and ſpirit of that act; and I

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ſhould not have ſuffered myſelf to have been miſled by any private views, to an abandonment of its proviſions, and a deſertion of its principles, when its validity was ſo fatally impeached in the time of the Regency. Much, however, as I venerate that act, as the only bond which now connects this kingdom with Great Britain, I cannot but conſider it, both in principle and operation, extremely defective. In principle it goes to hand over to the Parliament of another country, in *which we are not repreſented*, one of the moſt important legiſlative powers, that of regulating the ſucceſſion of the Crown; a power which never can be exerciſed by Great Britain, without jealouſy and diſtraction on the part of this country. Nor is the practice leſs defective than the principle, as was proved in the caſe of the Regency; for the Prince of Wales was abſolutely conſtituted Regent by the addreſs of the two Houſes of the Iriſh Parliament, before any Regent was appointed by Great Britain; ſo that the unity of the Executive Power, the only bond of our preſent connexion, was made to depend not on the proviſions of the act of Annexation, but upon the Britiſh Parliament coinciding in the choice of the Iriſh Parliament. To prove the dangers of this ſpecies of connexion, I have not only the meaſures adopted in the time of the Regency, but the authority of a Right Hon. and learned Member, (the late Prime Serjeant) who oppoſed the meaſure of Union. That Right Hon. Gentleman, Sir, introduced a Bill in the courſe of the laſt ſeſſion, to provide for the caſe of Regency. He ſo far admitted the inadequacy of the act of annexation. But when it was ſhewn to the Right Hon. Gentleman, that his Bill could be of no avail, unleſs he ſurrendered to the Parliament of another Kingdom the complete Legiſlation on this ſubject, his friends were ſo averſe to the idea, that he was obliged to abandon his Bill, thus at once confeſſing the weakneſs of the bond by which the unity of the

xecutive powers are ſecured, and the impoſſibility of maintaining it without a ſurrender of legiſlative independence. But the caſe of the Regency, Sir, is not the only caſe which has occurred to prove the dangers to which the Empire is expoſed by ſeparate legiſlatures. What, Sir, was the conduct of James the Second, when, after his abdication of the Crown of England, he came into this Country, and found a ſeparate Iriſh Parliament a convenient inſtrument for erecting his oppoſition to England, and eſtabliſhing a diſtinct Monarchy in Ireland, and thus afforded the ſtrongeſt practical proof of the tendency of diſtinct Legiſlatures to ultimate and total ſeparation? What, Sir, alſo was the caſe of Scotland, where, from the time of the Acceſſion of James the Firſt, to the Reign of Queen Anne, the unity of the executive power with diſtinct legiſlatures, produced a continued ſcene of jealouſy and diſtraction, until the Scotch Parliament finally introduced a meaſure for the entire ſeparation of the Crowns as well as the Parliaments.

Now, Sir, let me aſk the Houſe, upon all the great and complicated queſtions of war, of peace, of treaties, what is the ſituation of Ireland? Is ſhe not, in order to avoid the danger of ſeparation, and to prevent the ruin of the empire, abſolutely obliged to adopt, and regiſter, without deliberation, the edicts of Great Britain? In regiſtering her aſſent, is ſhe not forced to give up every conſideration of her private intereſts, and to ſacrifice every feeling of pride and independence? Does ſhe not feel jealouſy and diſcontent from this circumſtance? and, if the country ſhall advance in wealth, and proſperity, and power, will ſhe not grow more and more diſcontented at ſuch a ſtate of ſubordination; and will not, of courſe, the danger of ſeparation encreaſe with the motives for effecting it? Nor, Sir, are theſe the only objections to our preſent mode of connexion? It has been often and juſtly complain-

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ed of in this Houſe, that the Miniſter of this country, acting as he did under the directions of a Britiſh Cabinet, was not reſponſible to the Iriſh Parliament, from the moment he ſhould withdraw from this kingdom, unleſs by a derogation from our independence, we were to impeach him at the Bar of the Britiſh Parliament for offending againſt the Iriſh Conſtitution.

This incapacity of a ſeparate Parliament, to effect a due reſponſibility in the Miniſters of the Crown, was ſo ably demonſtrated by an honourable and learned Member (Mr. Fox) in his admirable ſpeech on a former debate, that it is unneceſſary for me to dwell upon the ſubject; but, let me aſk who adviſes the meaſures of the Iriſh Government? The Engliſh Miniſter. And how can the Iriſh Parliament reach *him?* Who adminiſters the Great Seal of England, without which no legiſlative act can be ratified? An Engliſh Miniſter. And how can the Iriſh Parliament reach *him?* In ſhort, Sir, how can an efficient and conſtitutional reſponſibility be effected, but by making the juriſdiction of Parliament as comprehenſive as the power of the Executive? And this, I muſt ever maintain, can be effected by an Union alone.

It is ſaid, Sir, that an Union will reduce Ireland to the abject ſituation of a colony. Is it, Sir, by making her a conſtituent part of the greateſt and firſt empire in the world? For my part, Sir, if I were to deſcribe a colony, I would picture a country in a ſituation ſomewhat ſimilar to that of Ireland at preſent. I would deſcribe a country, whoſe Crown was dependent on that of another country, enjoying a local Legiſlature, but without any power entruſted to that Legiſlature of regulating the ſucceſſion to that Crown. I would deſcribe it as having an executive power adminiſtered by the orders of a non-reſident Miniſter, irreſponſible to the colony for his acts or his advice; I would deſcribe

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it as incapable of paſſing the moſt inſignificant law without the licence of the Miniſter of another country ; I would deſcribe it as a country unknown to foreign nations, in the quality of an independent ſtate, and as ſubject to another power with regard to all the queſtions which concern alliances, the declaration and conduct of war, or the negociations for peace.

Another objection has been ſtarted, that an Imperial Parliament could not be poſſeſſed of ſuch local knowledge of the kingdom, as is neceſſary for the due encouragement of its intereſts. But I aſk, Sir, what is there to prevent the Repreſentatives of Ireland from carrying with them to the Imperial Parliament, all their local knowledge of the wants and intereſts of Ireland ? And what is there to prevent an Imperial Parliament from attending as anxiouſly to the concerns of this part of the Empire, as to the concerns of the weſt of England, or the concerns of Scotland ?

It has alſo been aſſerted, that an Union would have the effect of weakening the Executive Power in Ireland. Convinced, Sir, as I am, that Ireland cannot exiſt without a ſtrong Executive Power, and that the lives and properties of its loyal inhabitants cannot be otherwiſe ſecured, I could not argue in favour of the advantages which are promiſed by this meaſure, were it to be followed by ſuch a conſequence. But I feel ſo ſatisfied, that the contrary would be the caſe, that it is upon this very principle of giving new vigour to the Executive Power, and of giving additional ſecurity to the perſons and properties of the inhabitants, that I embrace the meaſure. It is a Union alone that can give us ſtrength, by removing the cauſe of our weakneſs. It will take away from the Executive all thoſe jealouſies which hang upon its motions, and prevent its conſtitutional effects ; it will get rid of the plauſible inſinuation,

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that we are governed by the influence of a Parliament, where we are not repreſented ; that we are directed by the councils of Miniſters who are irreſponſible ; that our intereſts are ſacrificed to thoſe of Great Britain ; in ſhort, it will get rid of all thoſe conſtitutional anomalies, and conſtitutional awkwardneſſes, which render all the exertions of the Executive Power ſuſpected and inefficient ; and, by rendering it unpopular, diminiſh and counteract its influence.

There is another objection which has been ſtrongly urged, and plauſibly ſupported. It is this :—that our local Parliament has, from the circumſtance of its being local, been able to make exertions for ſuppreſſing the rebellion which an Imperial Parliament would not have attempted. I moſt cordially admit, that the Iriſh Parliament has moſt materially aſſiſted the Government, by arming it with thoſe ample powers which have been employed to ſuppreſs the rebellion. But, if it was Parliament gave the powers, it was the Executive who employed them. And I aſk, by what conſtitutional ſcruples would an Imperial Parliament be prevented from giving the ſame powers in ſimilar circumſtances, or the Executive of the Empire be arreſted in the exerciſe of them ? Nor, Sir, is it agreeable to common ſenſe, or truth, that the acts of the Parliament of the Empire, would have leſs authority than the acts of only a part of the Empire ? It has alſo been ſaid, that a local Parliament alone could have traced and developed the conſpiracy which produced the late rebellion. Here, Sir, is a miſtake in point of fact. It was not the local Parliament, but the Executive Government which diſcovered the conſpiracy. It was the Executive Government that detected the plans of the traitors ; and it was upon the documents produced by the Executive Government, that the accurate report of the Secret Committee was formed. The merits of the report in diſcloſing the information

tion as a warning to the public, after the treaſon was detected and defeated, may be owing to Parliament; but the diſcovery of the conſpiracy, and the ſuppreſſion of the rebellion, were owing to the energies of the Executive Government.

I have thus ſhortly deſcanted upon that part of the plan which concerns the executive power, and the advantages which will be gained to Ireland in this eſſential part of the conſtitution, by adopting the meaſure of an Union. If I were to follow the order of the reſolutions, my next object would be to conſider the formation of the legiſlature; but, as the propoſitions I ſhall ſubmit on this head, will in a great meaſure reſult from the conſideration of the contributive powers of the iſland; I wiſh firſt to lay before the Houſe thoſe points which concern our finances and our commerce, and from them proceed to the legiſlative queſtion.

I ſhall now, therefore, ſtate to the Houſe the ſubſtance of the 5th article which I mean to ſubmit for their adoption, and which embraces the detail of the contribution which Ireland is to furniſh to the general expences of the empire.

The enemies of the meaſure of Union, have founded much of their clamour upon the groundleſs ſuppoſition, that it is a mere financial project of the Britiſh Miniſter, to put his hands into the pockets of the Iriſh people. But, ſir, I believe it will be found upon examination of the terms, that if any ſacrifice be made, it will not be on the part of Ireland, but upon the part of Great Britain. The ſettlement which is offered, is that of advantage to Ireland; but it is offered not as a bribe, not upon the mercenary principle that Ireland would ſacrifice what is eſſential to her happineſs to any pecuniary conſideration, but it is offered upon the fair and liberal ground of equal contribution.

I ſhall

I ſhall then firſt conſider upon what principles the two kingdoms are to be incorporated in point of contribution; ſecondly, the regulations which are to carry theſe principles into effect; and thirdly, I ſhall examine the operation of theſe regulations, as tending to increaſe or diminiſh the expences of Ireland.

The firſt principle which has been laid down by the liberality of the Britiſh Parliament is, that there ſhould be no retroſpect in regard to expences. Ireland is to have no concern whatever with the paſt debt of Great Britain. All the wealth, all the territories, all the commercial power and advantages of Great Britain, are to be fully laid open and communicated to Ireland, without demanding from her any contribution whatever to the ſupport of that immenſe debt, which ſhe has contracted in acquiring and ſecuring them. Such is the liberality of Great Britain; but, as to the future, it is expected that the two countries ſhould move forward together, and unite with regard to their expences in the meaſure of their relative abilities. I ſhould have conſidered it, Sir, as a moſt valuable circumſtance in this arrangement, if the two countries could at once have been ſo completely incorporated, as not to be under the neceſſity of having diſtinct revenues. This principle made a part of the Scotch Union; and it was naturally felt to be of ſuch importance, that a great effort was made to equalize the circumſtances of the two countries for that purpoſe. England had at that period a conſiderable debt; Scotland had none. An accurate calculation was therefore made of the ſum which Scotland ought to receive, as an indemnity for ſubjecting herſelf to the charges of the debt of England, and the ſum being aſcertained, was paid by England as an equivalent. The taxation of the two countries was accordingly ſubjected to the ſame ſcale, except in the article of

land-tax, which was fixed on a ſeparate proportion. And this difference aroſe from the circumſtance, that the land-tax in England was levied lightly and unequally, and the land-tax in Scotland was levied ſtrictly; ſo that, if the ſame rate of land-tax had been impoſed in Scotland, as was impoſed in England, Scotland would have been taxed much more than her juſt proportion. I mention theſe circumſtances, in order to ſhew the pains which were wiſely taken to incorporate Scotland with England, as far as poſſible in point of finance; and I lament that the circumſtances of Great Britain and Ireland, do not at preſent enable us to purſue the meaſure of identity with equal ſtrictneſs. It were to be wiſhed, that there was not an inſurmountable bar to a common ſyſtem, and a common treaſury, and that we could become like counties of the ſame kingdom, ſubject to the ſame ſyſtem of finances. Were our entire expenditures common (which would happen if neither kingdom had any ſeparate debts, or if their debts were in the proportion of their ability) by no ſyſtem whatever could they be made to contribute ſo ſtrictly according to their means, as by being ſubject to the ſame taxes, equally bearing upon the great objects of taxation in both countries. Such, however, is the diſproportion of the debts of the two kingdoms to each other at preſent, that a common ſyſtem for the preſent is impoſſible; nor could any ſyſtem of equivalent be applied for equalizing their contributions. It is, therefore, neceſſary that the debts of the two kingdoms ſhould be kept diſtinct, and that, of courſe their taxation ſhould be ſeparate and proportionate. The great point, therefore, to aſcertain, is, the beſt criterion which can be formed of the relative means of the two countries, in order to fix the relative proportion of their contributions.

Sir,

Sir, I conceive, the beſt poſſible criterion of the relative means and ability of two countries to bear taxation would be the produce of an income tax, levied on the ſame deſcription of incomes in each, and equally well levied in both. This criterion, however, is not at preſent to be found in Ireland, nor is it likely that for ſome time our local circumſtances will permit its operation. We muſt, therefore, reſort to ſome other teſt. I conſider then that the criterion next in order, is the joint reſult of commerce and conſumption, and that this may be ſatisfactorily aſcertained by a review of their exports and imports together with the quantities and values of the chief articles of their conſumption? I propoſe then to conſider the proportion which thoſe articles bear to each other, ſeparately and conjointly in Great Britain and Ireland; and if they nearly coincide, I ſhall take it for granted, that the beſt means of deciding the relative ability of the two countries are have been fairly taken.

Upon a compariſon of the average value of the imports and exports of Great Britain for three years, ending January 1799, compared with thoſe of Ireland ending the 25th of March preceding, I find that the value of Britiſh commerce

amounted to - - - £.73,961,899
Of Iriſh commerce to - - 10,925,961

and that they bear the proportion to each other of nearly ſeven to one.

Upon a ſimilar compariſon of the values of the following articles, viz. malt, beer, ſpirits, wine, tea, tobacco, ſugar, conſumed in the reſpective countries, I find that the value of the

Britiſh articles amounted to - £.46,891,655
Of the Iriſh articles to - - 5,954,856

which form a proportion of 7 7-8ths to one.

The medium, therefore, or $7\frac{1}{2}$ to 1, may be taken as the fair proportion; and I would maintain, that

upon this principle Great Britain ought to contribute fifteen parts, and Ireland two, to the general expences of the empire.

Having ſtated the principle of the article, I ſhall now enumerate its proviſions.

The firſt ſection provides, that the paſt debts of the two kingdoms ſhall be borne by them reſpectively; and if we couple this liberal proviſion with the 9th ſection of the article, which gives to Ireland a participation in whatever ſums may be produced from the territorial revenues of the dependencies of Great Britain in India, we muſt acknowledge not only the juſtice but the generoſity of the terms. Great Britain holds out to Ireland a fair participation in all the advantages of the Empire, without requiring the ſmalleſt participation in the burthens which ſhe has incurred to procure them; and Ireland will acquire a revenue of 58,000l. a year, in eaſe of her own burthens, out of the revenues paid by the Eaſt India Company, from the territories ſubdued by Britiſh arms.

The ſecond ſection will provide, that the proportionate contribution of 15 to 2, ſhall continue for twenty years, in order that the ſyſtem of the Union may acquire ſtability, before it be ſubjected to the ſlighteſt modification.

When I ſtated the ſyſtem of contributing on the principle of proportional ability, I was aware that a natural objection would ariſe, that however fair or liberal this ſyſtem might appear at preſent, it might at a future period, and under different circumſtances, prove to be both partial and diſadvantageous. It is, therefore intended, that the Imperial Parliament ſhall have a power to reviſe the proportion at the given period I have mentioned; but that the reviſion ſhould be grounded upon the ſame principles upon which the original proportion is formed, and limited to the reſult of thoſe princi-

ples.

ples. Our contributions, therefore, may hereafter vary according to our relative increaſed or diminiſhed ability; but, until the period of a common taxation ſhall ariſe, the principles, and the baſis of our contribution, are unalterably fixed. The only power reſerved to the Imperial Parliament, is to examine and aſcertain the criterions by which the abilities of the two countries are to be decided upon: the criterions themſelves are to remain unaltered and unalterable; and, as they are of ſuch a nature as that they cannot poſſibly fail of leading to a fair reſult, Ireland has by theſe means the utmoſt poſſible ſecurity, that ſhe cannot be taxed beyond the meaſure of her comparative ability, and that the ratio of her contribution muſt ever correſpond with her relative wealth and proſperity.

The 4th Section will provide, that the revenues of Ireland ſhould conſtitute a conſolidated fund, which will be charged in the firſt place with the intereſt and ſinking fund of the debt of Ireland, and be afterwards appropriated to its proportionate contribution. The 5th Section gives power to the Imperial Parliament, to impoſe ſuch taxes in Ireland as may be neceſſary for her contingent; but that in no caſe it ſhall be enabled to impoſe higher taxes, after the Union, upon any article in Ireland, than the ſame article ſhall be liable to in Great Britain. The 6th Section aſcertains the manner in which any ſurplus of the revenues of Ireland may be applied. There are four conſiderations which occur with reſpect to any exceſs of revenue, which may take place The firſt, and moſt obvious, is the diminution of taxes; the ſecond, is the application of ſuch exceſs to local purpoſes of ornament or improvement in Ireland; the third, is to provide againſt any poſſible failure of revenue, which may be expected in time of peace; the fourth, is to ſuffer ſuch exceſs, or ſurplus, to accumulate at compound intereſt,

in

in eaſe of our contribution in a future period of war. The reaſon which induces me to ſuggeſt the laſt method of diſpoſing of any ſurplus of revenue, ariſes from the different ſyſtems of Great Britain and Ireland, with reſpect to raiſing their ſupplies. Great Britain has at length eſtabliſhed the great principle, of raiſing a great part of her ſupplies within the year: this iſland is not at preſent in a ſituation to adopt a ſimilar ſyſtem. —The conſequence of which is, that the debt of Great Britain will hereafter increaſe in a much leſs degree, and be more rapidly liquidated, whilſt the debt of Ireland will be increaſing with greater rapidity, eſpecially if ſhe ſhall continue a ſeparate country; but, as an Union will greatly diminiſh her expences in time of peace, it is propoſed that this arrangement, with reſpect to any ſurplus of revenue ſhould be adopted, to prevent her too rapid accumulation of debt in time of war.

The 7th ſection provides, that all future loans, for the intereſt and liquidation of which the reſpective countries have made proviſions in the proportion of their reſpective contributions, ſhall be conſidered as joint debt; and on the other hand, that where they do not make correſponding proviſions, that their reſpective quotas of the ſum ſo raiſed ſhould remain a ſeparate charge, in like manner as debt contracted previous to the Union.

The 8th ſection contains a proviſion that, when the ſeparate debts of the two kingdoms ſhall be either extinguiſhed, or in the proportion of their reſpective Contributions, the general expences of the empire may be thenceforward borne by common taxes, in lieu of proportionate contribution.—I have, Sir, already explained the importance of an aſſimilation of the taxes of the two kingdoms. The obſtacle to its adoption at preſent, has been ſtated to be the diſparity of burthens, which ariſe from their

their reſpective debts, and which poſſibly may be removed by time. I ſhall, therefore, endeavour to obviate an impreſſion which may be made, that common taxes with Great Britain will impoſe upon this kingdom heavier burdens than ſhe would otherwiſe be called upon to ſupport. Let the Houſe then firſt conſider that the charges of the debt of Great Britain amount to 20 millions a-year, and the charges of the debt of Ireland to 1,300,000l. Britiſh a-year; that common taxes are not to take place, till either the paſt and ſeparate debts of both countries ſhall be liquidated, or till they ſhall become to each other in the proportion of their contributions; that is, in the ratio of 15 to 2. Before this can take place, the taxes of Gt. Britain muſt be reduced by the amount of ten millions a-year; in which caſe, the ſcale of her remaining taxation would be lowered to the ſcale of taxation in Ireland, and the adoption of Britiſh taxation would become a benefit; a ſimilar reſult would take place, and to a greater degree, were the paſt debt of the two countries to be entirely liquidated; for, in this caſe, Ireland would be exonerated from taxes, to the amount of 1 300,000l. a-year, and Britain to the amount of 20,000,000l. and the ſyſtem of common taxation would become ſtill more beneficial to Ireland. It may happen, however, that if war ſhould continue, and Ireland fund her ſupplies, whilſt England raiſes a great part of her's within the year, and mortgages her income tax to their rapid reduction in peace, that the proportion of the debt of Ireland may riſe, and her ſcale of taxation increaſe accordingly. In this caſe, alſo, the ſyſtem of common taxation perfectly ſecures the intereſts of Ireland being produced by natural cauſes, and in no degree forced. It cannot impoſe any burthen on this country to which ſhe muſt not in the ordinary courſe of her expenditure be liable, whilſt the proviſion which goes to preclude any article from being ſubject

ject to a higher rate of duty in Ireland than the ſame article pays in Great Britain, will exempt her from having the ſcale of her taxation raiſed above that of England, even though the natural progreſs of her expence ſhould lead to it. And whilſt Ireland is thus ſecured againſt any injuſtice in ſubſtituting a ſyſtem of common taxes in lieu of proportionable contribution, the United Parliament will be enabled to make abatements in Ireland as the Parliament of Great Britain always has done in Scotland ſince the Union; where, from local circumſtances, the high duty cannot be levied without either rendering the revenue unproductive, or preſſing too hard upon the poorer claſſes.

It now, Sir, remains for me to conſider the operation and effect of this article, and how far the proportion of $7\frac{1}{2}$ to 1 is favourable or otherwiſe to Ireland, conſidered with reference to the paſt expences of the two countries, as alſo to their probable future expenditure.

The Peace Eſtabliſhment of Great Britain in the year preceding the war, amounted to £5,806,744
That of Ireland amounted in the ſame year to - - - 1,012,523
The proportion of theſe ſums is about $5\frac{3}{4}$ to 1.

Upon an average of ſeven years, from the commencement of the war, Great Britain has expended each year - - - - - 27,650,649
Ireland has expended - - 3,076,651
The proportion of theſe ſums is about 9 to 1.

As, however, upon the experience of the paſt century, it is found that there are three years of peace to two of war; if we form our calculations upon this proportion, the paſt expences of Great Britain and Ireland may be conſidered in the ratio of $7\frac{3}{4}$ to 1.

Such is the reſult as to paſt expenditure. I ſhall now ſtate what we may expect from the propoſition of $7\frac{1}{2}$ to 1, in our future expences.

The

The expence of Great Britain for the year 1799, was - - £.32,700,000
That of Ireland, - - 5 4 9,000

If this expence had been borne in the proportion of 7½ to 1, Great Britain would have expended - - - 33,695,101
Ireland would have expended - 4,492,680
And Ireland would have, conſequently, ſaved - 947,311
Or 1,020,181l. in Iriſh currency.

So long, Sir, as the war ſhall laſt, and we ſhall continue ſeparate from Great Britain, it is not poſſible to ſuppoſe that our expence can be reduced; and, therefore, we ſhall in future expend more by one million a year, than if we were united with Great Britain.

I ſhall now advert to the probable future expences of Ireland in time of peace; and, if we conſider the advanced pay of the army, the increaſed charge of the militia, the neceſſity of keeping up ſome part of that invaluable force, the yeomanry, we ſhall find it impoſſible to maintain a peace eſtabliſhment of only 12,000 men at home, at a leſs charge than 1,500,000l. a year; and, if we were to increaſe our eſtabliſhment to 20,000 men, the whole charge would amount to 1,900,000l. a year. Now, Sir, from the beſt documents I have been able to procure, it appears that

The Peace Eſtabliſhment of Great Britain is like to amount to about £.7,500,000
Add that of Ireland, 1,500,000

£.9,000,000

If this charge be borne in the ratio of 7½ to 1, there would be a ſaving to Ireland of 450,000l. Britiſh or nearly 500,000l. Iriſh currency.

It may be aſked, Sir, how Great Britain can aſſent to an arrangement which ſeems calculated to

charge her with near half a million in time of peace, and a million in time of war? The anſwer is, that Great Britain is willing to become one kingdom with Ireland, and contribute proportionably with this kingdom, according to their relative means. If the proportion of expence ſhall be rightly fixed and aſcertained upon juſt principles, for every part of the empire, it is immaterial to Great Britain where the expenditure takes place. If the internal circumſtances of Ireland call for a large proportion of the army to be cantoned in this iſland, the expence will be greateſt here. If the ſouthern coaſt of England requires to be ſtrengthened, the expenditure will be directed to that quarter; but, can Scotland, and other parts of the empire, which equally contribute, but do not require any expenſive protection, feel any umbrage or jealouſy that their ſtate of ſecurity requires a leſs portion of troops, and a leſs proportion of expence, than the more expoſed or convulſed part of the two iſlands?

Now, Sir, let us for a moment turn to the ſituation of the public revenues. The produce of all the taxes in the laſt year amounted merely to 1,850,000l. and the preſent charges of the debt alone are near 1,400,000l. Iriſh currency. I will, however, admit that the revenues of this kingdom have, during the preſent year, experienced an extraordinary increaſe; but it is not poſſible to ſuppoſe, that the whole of this increaſe can be permanent, when it can be accounted for by the particular circumſtances of the times. I will, however, ſuppoſe that the revenues may produce a permanent

| | |
|---|---|
| ſum of - - - | £.2,300,000 |
| The charge of our debt is, | 1,400,000 |
| The Peace Eſtabliſhment, at the loweſt computation, will be - . | 1,500,000 |
| Total expence, | £.2,900,000 |

So

So that, if we remain a ſeparate ſtate, we ſhall have an annual deficiency of 600,000l. which we muſt endeavour to ſupply by new burthens upon the people; beſides raiſing additional taxes of 250,000l. a year, ſo long as the war ſhall continue. If, on the contrary, we wiſely unite with Great Britain, and agree in a ſyſtem of contribution proportionate to our reſpective means, the future charge of our war expence will be diminiſhed a million a year; and we ſhall be able to ſupport our Peace Expenditure with a very ſlight addition to the preſent taxes. I now then confidently appeal to thoſe gentlemen around me, who have a real ſtake in the intereſts and happineſs of this country; and, I truſt, they will ſeriouſly pauſe and deliberate before they ſuffer advantages, like theſe which I have ſtated, to be rejected without diſcuſſion, or to be decided by wild and ſenſeleſs clamour.

I ſhall now proceed to ſubmit thoſe regulations, by which it is propoſed that the commerce of this kingdom ſhould be adjuſted. The principles which are to form its baſis will not materially differ from thoſe adopted in the commercial propoſitions in 1785, which you, Mr. Speaker, ſupported with ſuch ability at that period, and which are freſh in the recollection of the Houſe. I truſt, however, that what I ſhall have the honor to ſubmit, will in ſome inſtances go beyond the propoſed ſettlement of that day; and I have no doubt that my ſtatement will receive the approbation of the Houſe, as the propoſitions of 1785 were approved on a commercial view of the ſubject, and rejected merely on conſtitutional grounds.

I could have wiſhed, Mr. Speaker, that the ſituation of Ireland could have been ſo entirely aſſimilated at once to that of Great Britain, as that there ſhould be no greater difference between them, than between two counties in the ſame kingdom, and

their commerce and intercourſe ſhould be mutually free. There are, however, two circumſtances which may for a time prevent this complete and entire identity. The firſt, is the neceſſity of conſulting the ſituation of particular manufactures, which may require, to a certain degree, a continuance of that guard and protection, which they have received to ſhelter their infant ſtate. The ſecond ariſes from the unequal burthens of Great Britain, in conſequence of her paſt debt, and which has unavoidably created an inequality of internal taxes. As, therefore, it is propoſed that the export to each country ſhall be free, it is neceſſary that duties, on importation, ſhould be impoſed, to balance and countervail the internal duties in either country. Theſe will naturally ceaſe when a ſyſtem of common taxes ſhall be adopted; and, as a perfect freedom of trade is the great object to contend for, I would ſuggeſt alſo, that in the articles to be ſecured by protecting duties, the exceptions ought to be as few as circumſtances will admit; and that the departure from that freedom, ought to ceaſe when the neceſſity ceaſes, which juſtifies their adoption.

The regulations, Sir, on theſe ſubjects, are contained in the 6th article which I ſhall propoſe, and the article itſelf is divided into ſix ſections.

By the firſt ſection, the ſubjects, and the produce of either country, are placed upon an equal footing for ever as to all privileges, encouragements, and bounties. This, Sir, gives the continuance for ever of the Britiſh and Iriſh bounties on the export of Iriſh linens, and affords us a full participation in the great article of ſail-cloth. It is at preſent provided that the ſail cloth uſed in the Britiſh Navy, and the firſt ſet of ſails uſed in Britiſh merchant ſhips, ſhould be of Britiſh manufacture; by this ſection, Iriſh ſail-cloth will be admitted to all the privileges of Britiſh, and we ſhall have the great and immenſe

market

market ariſing from the Britiſh Navy, and the ſupplying Britiſh ſhipping given as an encouragement to purſue a manufacture, for which both the ſoil and habits of this kingdom are peculiarly calculated.

By the ſecond Section, all prohibitions on the export of the produce of either country to the other are to ceaſe, and all articles are to be exported duty free. This ſecures to Ireland for ever the raw materials which ſhe receives from Great Britain, and which ſhe can no where elſe procure: coals, tin, bark, allum, hops and ſalt. It alſo concedes to Ireland the ſtaple commodity of Engliſh wool. I ſaid, Sir, that the preſent plan went beyond the propoſitions in 1785. By the treaty of 1785, Great Britain retained a duty of 1s. 6d. per ton upon coals exported to Ireland; that duty ſhe gives up to Ireland as the conſuming country; and the produce of it will hereafter aſſiſt the revenues of Ireland. By the treaty of 1785, the exports of Britiſh wool remained prohibited; it is here offered to the Iriſh manufacturers. The ſyſtem of Union puts an end at once to all jealouſy between the nations, and gives to each the full and free participation of their reſpective advantages.

The ſame ſection puts an end to all bounties whatever on the articles of trade between the two kingdoms, with exception to malt, flour and grain, which it is propoſed may be ſtill regulated on the preſent ſyſtem, unleſs it ſhall appear hereafter expedient to the united Parliaments to alter it.

The 3d ſection enumerates the articles which are to be ſubject to duty in either country, and fixes the rate of duty on each article. I have ſaid, that a perfect freedom of trade, is the great object to be contended for; and, therefore, the quantum of duty ſhould not be greater than abſolutely neceſſary, nor ſhould it remain longer, or be impoſed on more articles than neceſſity requires. As to the amount

of

of duty, I have adverted to the propoſitions in 1785, which aſſumed a duty of 10½. per cent. as an adequate duty of protection; the duties which have been ſince impoſed on Britiſh goods, have been with a view of creating revenue more than of giving protection; and, as the fabrics of Ireland have certainly made a conſiderable advance ſince 1785, I am of opinion that a duty of 10 per cent. on the true value, will be fully ſufficient, in addition to the charges of freight, &c which are eſtimated at 5½ per cent. to give adequate protection to the fabrics of this kingdom. I muſt ſubmit, that any manufacture in this kingdom that cannot be carried on with a protecting guard of 15½ per cent. againſt the manufacturer of England, where taxes are higher and labour dearer, cannot deſerve much encouragement. Nor is it fair in ſuch a caſe to ſacrifice the intereſts of the conſumer, or encourage by high duties the habits of indolence. When I fix this rate of protection, I wiſh it ſhould continue for ſuch a period of years, as will give ſecurity to the ſpeculations of the manufacturers, at the ſame time I wiſh to look forward to a period when duties of this kind may gradually be diminiſhed, and ultimately ceaſe. It muſt be evident to every man, that if our manufactures keep pace in advancement for the next twenty years, with the progreſs they have made in the laſt twenty years, that they may at the expiration of it, be fully able to cope with the Britiſh; and that the two kingdoms may be ſafely left, like any two counties of the ſame kingdom, to a free competition. It is, therefore, provided, that after twenty years, the United Parliament may diminiſh the duties of protection in ſuch a ratio, as the ſituation of our manufactures at that period may render expedient. As all articles, except thoſe enumerated in the reſolution, are to be hereafter free from duty upon import,

port, I muſt draw the attention of the Houſe to the perpetual ſecurity which is here offered to the linen manufacture of this kingdom. I know, Sir, that it has been frequently aſſerted, that the linen manufacture derives all its proſperity from the encouragement it has received from our local Parliament; but I have ever conteſted the truth of that ſtatement. The proſperity of the linen manufacture reſults not from domeſtic encouragement, but from its poſſeſſion of the Britiſh market, and the Britiſh bounties on re-export. What then, Sir, is it gives us that market, but the liberality of Great Britain, who lays a duty of 33 per cent. upon foreign linens, and admits Iriſh linens duty free. The whole quantity of linens imported into Great Britain, amounts to 50,000,000l. of yards, of which 33 millions go from Ireland Now, if a duty of 33 per cent. were laid upon Iriſh linens, as well as foreign, it would produce a ſum of more than a million a year to the revenue of Great Britain; and, in doing ſo, it muſt evidently throw the trade altogether into the hands of the foreign manufacturer.

It has alſo been urged, that theſe encouragements granted to Iriſh linens, were in conſequence of a compact that the Iriſh Parliament ſhould give up the woollen manufacture. It muſt be a ſingular compact indeed, by which Great Britain was irrevocably to bind herſelf, to impoſe on her own ſubjects the burthen of a million ſterling a year, in order to ſecure an export of woollen goods which has never exceeded 680,000l. a year. But, if I were to allow that a compact exiſted, Ireland, by this propoſal, will have both parts of it, ſhe will keep what ſhe has by linens, and recover what ſhe is ſuppoſed given up in woollens, as the price of theſe encouragements. She will not only enjoy for ever the Britiſh markets for her linen trade, but will receive the raw material of England, for the improve-

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ment and extenſion of her woollen trade. And ſhe will have Britiſh bounties to favour the re-exports of the former, and low Britiſh duties to encourage the import of the latter.

It has been ſtated, that Great Britain lays the high duty on the foreign linens to protect her own manufacture, and not to favour ours. Let it be admitted then, what prevents her from laying the ſame duty on Iriſh linens, can any other reaſon be aſſigned than diſpoſition to protect the manufactures of Ireland. Suppoſe Great Britain was only to lay on a protecting duty of 10l. per cent. to be laid on the import of Iriſh linens in favour of her own. In doing ſo, ſhe would only act towards us as we do towards her in almoſt all the leading articles of Britiſh manufacture; and what would be the effect? It would exclude us in a great meaſure from her market. The foreign manufacturer, who now ſupplies nearly 1-3 of her demand, ever under the diſadvantage of a duty of 33l per cent. would then ſupply nearly the whole. The Engliſh conſumer would buy his linens nearly as cheap, whilſt the ſtate would levy an annual revenue on the import, which is now ſacrificed to the encouragement of the manufacture of this country. Is it then to the local Parliament, or to the Parliament of Great Britain, that Ireland is indebted for theſe advantages? Sir, it is to the Parliament of Great Britain alone—to the Parliament of that country; which has been deſcribed in a former debate, as the natural and inſtinctive enemy of Ireland, that we owe the obligation. That hoſtile country ſacrifices a ſum annually to the protection of the Linen Trade of this country, equal in amount to the total expence of our Peace Eſtabliſhment, as it ſtood before the war; and, by this treaty, ſhe binds herſelf to continue it for ever.

I need not expatiate upon the 6th ſection, which merely goes to lay ſuch countervailing duties as may balance

balance internal duties. Theſe are, as I have ſaid neceſſary upon the principles of juſtice, ſo long as the two kingdoms ſhall be ſubject to unequal taxes, and when the inequality of taxes ſhall ceaſe, and a common revenue take place, they will be diſcontinued.

The 5th and 6th ſection may be of great commercial conſequence, as they provide, that the charges upon the re-export of native, foreign, and colonial goods, ſhall be the ſame in both countries, and that no drawbacks ſhall be retained upon any article exported from either country to the other.—Whoever, Sir, conſiders and underſtands the nature of our commerce, and the advantages of our ſituation, muſt allow that the ſecuring the perpetuity of theſe regulations to Ireland, muſt be attended with the greateſt benefits. It is acknowledged, that the ſituation of Ireland is much more advantageous for the re-export trade then Great-Britain, as we are not ſubject to the dangerous and tedious navigation of the Channels: but when it is conſidered that the tranſit, or re-export trade of Britain, amounts to 14,000,000l. a year, Gentlemen will admit, that the proſpect of national advantage from this part of the ſyſtem, is highly worth our attention; and I appeal to the Houſe, that there is no benefit which the cities of Cork and Dublin may not expect, when in order to carry this article into effect, the ſyſtem of bonding foreign goods for exportation ſhall be extended, and arrangements be made for converting thoſe harbours as far as poſſible into free ports.

Upon the review of the reſult of this article, we find our linen trade ſecured, the proſpect of a great woollen trade opened, a great manufactory of ſail-cloth encouraged, the Britiſh market opened to us by low duties, in caſe we ſhall ſkilfully make uſe of our domeſtic advantages; and at the ſame time the Britiſh market ſecured for our great proviſion trade,

whilſt an additional encouragement is given to our farmers, in taking off the duty on the produce of their lands.

This leads me to conſider the effect of the propoſed Commercial Regulations upon the Revenue; and here we ſhall again find the advantage of the ſyſtem: Firſt, the duties on the export of our hides, tallow, cattle, and proviſions, will ceaſe, which produce, - - - - £.44,000

The loſs of Revenue by taking off duties, and by lowering duties from 12½ to 10 per Cent. will amount to - 32,000

Total loſs, - £.79,000

But, to balance this loſs, we ſhall gain the duty of 1s. 3d. a ton upon coals, which is raiſed at preſent upon Iriſh conſumption, and amounts, per ann. to, - - - £.17,000

We ſhall gain the duties which are retained in England on ſubſidy goods - - 9000

And we ſhall receive our proportion of 500,000l. from the India company, - - 58,000

Gain - £.82,000.

Thus taxes are remitted, which at preſent are raiſed either on Iriſh produce or Iriſh conſumption, whilſt the loſs of revenue is fully compenſated by a transfer of duties now payable into the Exchequer of Great Britain.

The 8th ſection of this article, provides that a ſum equal to what is now applied to charitable purpoſes, and to the encouragement of manufactures, ſhall continue to be ſo applied annually by the United Parliament; thus ſecuring a continuance of

of the Linen Board, and other local inſtitutions, which have hitherto received the bounty of Parliament.

I have now explained the nature of this article, as it affects us in our manufacture, our commerce, and our revenue, I truſt, I have demonſtrated it, to be fair and liberal, and calculated to invite into this kingdom the capital of Great Britain, and to introduce an induſtrious race of manufactures, and mercantile people.

I now proceed to that part of the queſtion which concerns Religion and the Church Eſtabliſhment of this country. One State, one Legiſlature, one Church; theſe are the leading features of the ſyſtem, and without identity with Great Britain, in theſe three great points of connexion, we never can hope for any real and permanent ſecurity. The Church in particular, whilſt we remain a ſeparate country, will ever be liable to be impeached upon local grounds, and can never be ſheltered from the argument of phyſical force, which is ſo continually brought againſt it; but when it ſhall be once completely incorporated with the Church of England, it will be placed upon ſuch a ſtrong and natural foundation, as to be above every apprehenſion and fear from adverſe intereſt, and by all the fretting and irritating circumſtances connected with our colonial ſituation, there muſt be a perpetual queſtion afloat as to the fundamental principles of our conſtitution, ſo long as we remain a ſeparate country; and no country can ever know permanent tranquillity, whoſe conſtitution is made a perpetual ſubject of queſtion.

So long as the countries remain ſeparate, the Government of Ireland muſt be a choice between dangers and difficulties; preſſed by theſe difficulties, different miniſters will entertain different opinions, as to the beſt mode of preſerving Ireland in connexion with Great Britain, and of withholding its eſtabliſh-

ments. This Miniſter will approve of maintaining the Proteſtant authority in its utmoſt ſtrictneſs, and will conſider the principle of Catholic excluſion as the means of ſecurity, and the beſt bond of connexion. Another Miniſter, finding the difficulty ſtill prominent and preſſing, may throw himſelf for relief on principles more conſonant to the population of the country, and may incline to open the conſtitution to all ſects; hence a perpetual ſource of fluctuation in the principles upon which our ſeparate Government will be conducted, and this circumſtance alone muſt bring into action, with tenfold violence, the natural diſſentions of Ireland, by alternately flattering and diſcouraging the hopes of the contentious intereſts; and yet, a firm Government, and a ſteady ſyſtem, can never be hoped for ſo long as the conſtitution and eſtabliſhments of Ireland can be made a ſubject of ſeparate queſtion and experiment

The Proteſtant, ſo long as the eſtabliſhment remains ſeparate, and is impeached on local grounds, will feel his power, his property, and his government inſecure, and muſt naturally look with diſtruſt and jealouſy on the Catholic; the Catholic will feel proportionate alienation and reſentment, and will continually urge his claims againſt the eſtabliſhment of the minority; and there appears no hope whatever of a termination to diſtruſt, jealouſy, and alarm. But, ſo ſoon as the Church Eſtabliſhments of the two kingdoms ſhall be incorported into one church. The Proteſtant will feel himſelf at once identified with the population and property of the Empire, and the eſtabliſhment will be placed upon its natural baſis. The cauſe of diſtruſt muſt vaniſh with the removal of weakneſs, ſtrength and confidence will produce liberality, and the claims of the Catholics may be temperately diſcuſſed, and impartially decided before an Imperial Parliament, diveſt-

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ed of thoſe local circumſtances which produce irritation and jealouſy, and prevent a fair and reaſonable deciſion.

I ſhall here, Sir, notice the imputation that the Roman Catholic Clergy have been *bribed* to the ſupport of this meaſure; it is an illiberal imputation thrown out for the dangerous purpoſe of weakening their authority over, by lowering them in the opinion of their flocks; for it is known, that an arrangement, both for the Catholic and Diſſenting Clergy, has been long in the contemplation of his Majeſty's Government. As to the inſinuation, that the meaſure of Union is a meaſure of bribery; if bribery and publick advantage are ſynonimous. I muſt readily admit, that it is a meaſure of the moſt comprehenſive bribery that was ever produced: It bribes the whole community of Ireland, by offering to embrace them within the pale of the Britiſh conſtitution, and to communicate to them all the advantage of Britiſh commerce. It is this kind of bribe which is held out to the Proteſtant, to the Catholic, to the Diſſenter; it is this kind of bribe which is held out to the merchant, to the manufacturer, to the landholder——indeed, I know but of one claſs in the community to which an Union would not act as a bribe: It is to thoſe who call themſelves the lovers of liberty and independence. That liberty, which conſiſts in the abdication of the Britiſh Conſtitution, that independence, which conſiſts in the abandonment of Britiſh Connexion, and I acknowledge that theſe are bribes which I am not prepared to offer. There are many with whom I am not prepared to make any treaty, but the treaty of the law.

I now, Sir, beg leave to recur to the queſtion of Repreſentation, which in the early part of my argument I had requeſted to poſtpone; and before I enter into the ſubject, I muſt beg leave to proteſt againſt

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the reaſoning of thoſe, who pretend to aſſume, that there can be no equality in the principles of an Union, where the uniting parties ſhall not be repreſented in a common legiſlature by equal numbers. This principle, Sir, is founded upon the common and refuted error, that the two kingdoms, after an Union, will ſtill retain diſtinct and adverſe intereſts. But, Sir, if I were to allow the fact, the remedy which is propoſed, ſo far from curing would augment the diſorder. Diſtinct and rival intereſts, ſo far from being remedied by equality of numbers, in the repreſentation of the two uniting kingdoms, would, from the very circumſtance of ſuch equality, break forth into jealous and hoſtile competition. I ſhall, therefore, proceed on a principle directly the reverſe: and arguing upon the precedent of Scotland, and aſſuming that two kingdoms, when once united and incorporated, will no longer have a ſeparate but a common intereſt, and a common ſenſe of that intereſt, I ſhall lay it down, that the beſt ſecurity for the liberty of an empire, is to form its repreſentation upon the baſis of its wealth and population. Theſe principles were the guides to thoſe great Characters who formed the Union with Scotland; and it is upon theſe that I ſhall ground the ſyſtem I intend propoſing to the Houſe.

The population of Ireland is in general eſtimated from 3,500,000l. to 4,000,000l.—The population of Great Britain is calculated to exceed 10,000,000l. The contribution which it is propoſed, that Ireland ſhall furniſh to the expences of the empire, is as one to $7\frac{1}{2}$ —Theſe two proportions taken together, will produce a mean proportion of about $5\frac{1}{4}$ to 1.—I ſhall, therefore, ſubmit, that if Ireland ſhall ſend 100 Members to repreſent her in the imperial Houſe of Commons, ſhe will be fairly and adequately repreſented.

With regard to the Peerage, I would propoſe that the

the Repreſentative Body for that part of the Legiſlature, ſhould conſiſt of four ſpiritual, and twenty-eight temporal Lords: and, when it is conſidered that above forty Britiſh Peers, having great intereſts and ſtake in this kingdom, are already Peers of Great Britain, I flatter myſelf that our intereſts in that branch of the Legiſlature, will be ſufficiently maintained by a body ſo numerous and reſpectable.

With regard to the election of the Peerage, who are to ſit in the imperial Parliament, I would propoſe that the four ſpiritual Peers ſhould ſit by rotation of Seſſions; and that, in order to prevent the inconveniences which reſult from ſeptennial elections, the 28 temporal Peers ſhould be returned for life. Such an arrangement appears, Sir, at once beſt calculated to ſecure their independence, and to preſerve, as far as poſſible the hereditary principle of the Peerage. It is alſo intended to interfere in as ſmall a degree as poſſible with any exiſting privileges of the Peerage of Ireland; and I ſhall ſuggeſt, with this view, that the Peers of Ireland may ſtill be allowed to ſit in the Houſe of Commons of the United Parliament, for any county or borough of Great Britain; but, that during the period of their thus ſitting as Commoners, they ſhall be tried as Commoners, and be precluded from being choſen to repreſent the Iriſh Peerage, or vote at the election of any Peer; and, as the Iriſh Peerage materially differs from the Scotch, in as much as the Peers of the latter are entailed generally, and the former limited to the heirs male, it is intended to reſerve a power to the Crown of creating Iriſh Peers, ſo that the number of Peers exiſting at the time of the Union be not augmented.

In forming the Repreſentation of the Commons of Ireland, I ſhall ſuggeſt the expediency of increaſing the proportion, and ſtrengthening the influence of the counties. This principle was wiſely adopted in the Scotch Union, when the Repreſentatives for the

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counties amounted to 30, and thoſe of the boroughs to 15. In following this precedent, I intend propoſing that the 64 county Members ſhould be elected. as at preſent, and that 36 ſhould repreſent the chief cities and towns of the kingdom. Here the proportion is nearly the ſame.

In order to produce a return of 36 Members only, to repreſent the boroughs and cities of Ireland, which conſiſt of 118 places, ſome principle muſt be reſorted to, either of ſelection or combnation The latter principle was reſorted to in the Scotch Union, where the boroughs were divided into 15 claſſes, each claſs conſiſting of four or five boroughs, each borough electing a delegate, and the majority of delegates electing a burgeſs. It has, however, been found by experience, that this mode of election is ſubject to much inconvenience and cabal, and I would therefore ſuggeſt as preferable, and as the leaſt objectionable mode, that the moſt conſiderable towns in the kingdom ſhould alone be permitted to ſend Repreſentatives, and that the privileges of the other boroughs ſhould ceaſe. I ſhall therefore ſubmit, that the two great cities of Cork and Dublin ſhould each ſend two Repreſentatives, as at preſent; that one ſhould be returned by the Univerſity; and that the thirtyone moſt conſiderable cities and towns of Ireland, whoſe relative importance is to be meaſured by the joint conſideration of their wealth and population, ſhould each ſend a Member to the Imperial Parliament.

For this purpoſe, it is not my intention, to ſuggeſt any alteration of the exiſting Charters. For the Britiſh Conſtitution does not excluſive y prefer any particular mode of election; but, from wiſe conſiderations, admits every poſſible variety; and the perfection of that Conſtitution is not the direct conſequence of any one peculiar principle, but is owing to the harmonious reſult of according but various principles.

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In forming, however, the criterion by which the cities and boroughs, who are to retain the privilege of returning Repreſentatives, is to be aſcertained, ſome broad principle of preference muſt be aſſumed, without reference to any ſuppoſed conſtitutional inference; and I ſhould therefore ſuggeſt, that there are no means by which the relative importance of towns can be ſo adequately aſcertained, as by the compound reſult of the Hearth-money and Window Tax.

I have to regret, that this great Meaſure cannot be carried into effect, without its being felt as a grievance by thoſe perſons, whoſe property is connected with the Parliamentary Boroughs, and whoſe influence will be greatly diminiſhed by the diſcontinuance of their privilege to return burgeſſes to Parliament. At the ſame time I feel, that the conſideration of the injury they may ſuſtain, is a ſubject of the greateſt conſtitutional delicacy.

As, however, upon every ſubject of national improvement, the claims of private juſtice, and perſonal privilege and property, muſt ever demand an adequate conſideration, I ſhall think it my duty, ſhould it fortunately happen, that the plan I have ſubmitted ſhall be finally approved, to offer to the Houſe ſome meaſure of compenſation to thoſe whoſe peculiar intereſts ſhall have ſuffered in the arrangement.

Much and deep objection may be ſtated to ſuch a meaſure; but it, ſurely, is conſonant to the principles of private juſtice; it is calculated to meet the feelings of the moderate; and it is better to reſort to ſuch a meaſure, however objectionable, than adhere to the preſent ſyſtem, and keep afloat, for ever, the dangerous queſtion of Parliamentary Reform. If this be a meaſure of purchaſe, let us recollect that it will be the purchaſe of peace, and the expence of it will be redeemed by one year's ſaving of the union.

It may be objected, that a repreſentation formed on the principle I have ſuggeſted, may be too popular in its nature and effects; and, I confeſs, that if Ireland were to remain ſeparate from Great Britain, I ſhould feel the full weight of that objection; but, as our repreſentation is to be mixed with the repreſentation of Great Britain, I conceive, that any danger ariſing from its popular conſtitution, will be ſufficiently counteracted by the conſiſtency and ſtability of that body.

The great danger of our preſent and diſtinct conſtitution, peculiarly ariſes from the defective arrangement of the Houſe of Commons; and, in the early part of my parliamentary life, I was ſo ſenſible to this defect, that I was for ſome time a ſtrenuous advocate for parliamentary reform. When, however, the policy of government thought fit to alter the conſtituency, and introduce into the elective body a new claſs of the inhabitants, I felt the danger of the meaſure ſo far ſuperſede the inconvenience of our exiſting conſtitution, that I deſiſted from my ideas of reform, and acquainted my conſtituents with the reaſons of my conduct. And this is my anſwer to the Honourable Gentleman oppoſite me, to all thoſe charges of inconſiſtency, which he has ſo often levelled againſt me.

I have now only to ſtate, that the laſt article will provide for the continuance of the exiſting laws, for the preſerving the Courts of Juſtice in their preſent ſtate, and for the removal of appeals to the houſe of Lords of the Imperial Parliament; and ſo ſubjecting the Prize Court of Admiralty to the Lord High Admiral of the Empire. Theſe are neceſſary proviſions which are unavoidably incident to the meaſure of Union; and do not at preſent require any particular explanation and detail.

Having now, Sir, gone through the outline of the plan, with as much conciſeneſs as poſſible, I truſt I have

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proved to every man who hears me, that the propoſal is ſuch an one as is at once honourable for Great Britain to offer, and for Ireland to accept. It is one, which will entirely remove thoſe anomalies from the executive, which are the perpetual ſources of diſcontent and jealouſy. It is one, which will relieve the apprehenſions of thoſe who fear that Ireland was in conſequence of an Union to be burthened with the debt of Great Britain. It is one, which, by eſtabliſhing a fair principle of contribution, goes to releaſe Ireland from an expence of one million in time of war, and of 500,000l. in time of peace. It is one, which increaſes the reſources of our commerce, protects our manufactures, ſecures to us the Britiſh market, and encourages all the products of our ſoils. It is one, that by uniting the Church Eſtabliſhments, and conſolidating the Legiſlatures of the Empire, puts an end to religious jealouſy, and removes the poſſibility of ſeparation. It is one, which places the great Queſtion, which has ſo long agitated the country upon the broad principles of imperial policy, and diveſts it of all its local difficulties. It is one, which eſtabliſhes ſuch a Repreſentation for the country, as muſt lay aſleep for ever the queſtion of Parliamentary Reform; which, combined with our religious diviſions, has produced all our diſtractions and calamities.

Raſh, indeed, would be the man who ſhould aſſert, that the dangers in which we have been involved are entirely paſt. We have, however, made ſome progreſs towards ſecurity; and it is worth while for Gentlemen to conſider, that it is to that great character we owe the preſent propoſal, by whoſe penetrating ſagacity, and invincible conſtancy of mind, under the moſt tremendous dangers, not only this iſland owes the ſecurity in which it ſtands, but all Europe is indebted for its preſervation from anarchy and deſolation. If ſuch a period of danger were to

recur, it is more than poſſible, that Great Britain may not have ſuch a character to riſe up again for her ſalvation. It becomes us, therefore, to ſeize the preſent moment, and to ſtrengthen the Iriſh Conſtitution by blending and uniting it for ever with the great and powerful Empire of Great Britain.

If this great work ſhall be effected, and if at any future day the enemies of Great Britain and mankind ſhall again be let looſe upon the ſocial world, I doubt not that Ireland will be in ſuch a ſituation of unanimity and power as to bear a conſpicuous part with Great Britain in the glorious taſk of again delivering and reſtoring the liberties of Europe.

FIRST RESOLUTION.

That in order to promote and ſecure the eſſential intereſt of Great Britain and Ireland, and to conſolidate the ſtrength, power, and reſources of the Britiſh empire, it will be adviſeable to concur in ſuch meaſures as may beſt tend to unite the two kingdoms of Great Britain and Ireland into one kingdom, in ſuch manner, and on ſuch terms and conditions, as may be eſtabliſhed by the acts of the reſpective Parliaments of Gt. Britain and Ireland.

ARTICLE 1.—Reſolved, That for the purpoſe of eſtabliſhing an Union upon the baſis ſtated in the reſolutions of the two Houſes of the Parliament of Great Britain, communicated by his Majeſty's command in the meſſage ſent to this Houſe by his Excellency the Lord Lieutenant, it would be fit to propoſe as the firſt article of Union, that the kingdoms of Great Britain and Ireland ſhall, upon the 1ſt day of January, which ſhall be in the year of Our Lord 1801, and for ever after, be united into one kingdom, by the name of the united kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and that the royal ſtile and titles appertaining to the Imperial Crown of the ſaid united kingdom and its dependencies, and alſo the enſigns armorial, flags and banners thereof, ſhall be ſuch as his Majeſty, by his royal proclamation under the great ſeal of the united kingdom, ſhall be pleaſed to appoint.

ART. 2.—Reſolved, That for the ſame purpoſe it would be fit to propoſe, that the ſucceſſion to the Imperial Crown of the ſaid united kingdom, and of the dominions thereunto belonging, ſhall continue limited and ſettled in the ſame manner as the ſucceſſion to the Imperial Crown of the ſaid kingdoms of Great Britain and Ireland now ſtands limited and ſettled, according to the exiſting laws, and to the terms of the Union between England and Scotland.

ART. 3.—Reſolved, That for the ſame purpoſe it would be fit to propoſe, that the ſaid united kingdom be repreſented n one and the ſame Parliament, to be ſtiled the Parliament of the united kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.

ART. 4.—Reſolved, That for the ſame purpoſe it would be fit to propoſe, that of the Peers of Ireland at the time of the Union, four Spiritual Lords, by rotation of ſeſſions, and twenty eight Temporal Peers for life, ſhall be the number to ſit and vote in the Houſe of Lords, and one hundred Commoners (viz. two for each county of Ireland, two for the city of Dublin, two for the city of Cork, and one for each of the thirty-two moſt conſiderable cities, towns, and boroughs)

boroughs) be the number of Repreſentatives of Ireland in the Houſe of Commons of the Parliament of the united kingdom; that for the ſame purpoſe ſuch acts as ſhall be paſſed by the Parliament of Ireland previous to the Union, to regulate the mode by which the Spiritual Lords and Temporal Peers, and the Commoners to ſerve in the Parliament of the united kingdom on the part of Ireland, ſhall be ſummoned or returned to the ſaid Parliament, ſhall be conſidered as forming part of the Union, and ſhall be incorporated in the acts of the reſpective Parliaments by which the ſaid Union ſhall be ratified and eſtabliſhed. That all queſtions touching the election of Peers of Ireland to ſit in the Parliament of the united kingdom, ſhall be decided by the Houſe of Lords thereof; and whenever there ſhall be an equality of votes in the election of Peers, the names of ſuch Peers who have an equal number of votes in their favour, ſhall be written on pieces of paper of a ſimilar form, and ſhall be put into a glaſs by the clerk of the Parliament, at the table of the Houſe of Lords, whilſt the Houſe is ſitting; and the Peer whoſe name ſhall be firſt drawn out by the clerk of the Parliament ſhall be deemed the Peer elected. That any Peer of Ireland ſhall be capable of being elected as a repreſentative for any county, city, or borough of Great Britain, in the Houſe of Commons of the united kingdom, provided that ſo long a ſuch Peer of Ireland ſhall ſerve in the Houſe of Commons he ſhall not be capable of being elected to ſerve as a Peer on the part of Ireland, or be qualified to vote at the election of any Peer, and that he ſhall be liable to be tried as a Commoner. That it ſhall be lawful for his Majeſty, his heirs and ſucceſſors, to create Peers of that part of the united kingdom called Ireland, and to make promotions in the Peerage thereof after the Union, provided the number of Peers ſhall not by ſuch creation at any time be encreaſed beyond the number exiſting on the ſaid firſt day of January, 1801; and if any Peerage ſhall at any time be in abeyance, ſuch Peerage ſhall be deemed and taken as an exiſting Peerage, and no Peerage ſhall be deemed extinct unleſs on default of claimants to the inheritance of ſuch Peerage for the ſpace of one year from the death of the perſon who ſhall have been laſt poſſeſſed thereof; and if no claim ſhall be made to the inheritance to ſuch Peerage in ſuch form and manner as may from time to time be preſcribed by the Houſe of Lords of the united kingdom before the expiration of the ſaid period of a year, then, and in that caſe ſuch Peerage ſhall be deem-

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ed extinct, and a new Peer may be created, provided that nothing herein ſhall exclude any perſon from afterwards putting in a claim to the Peerage ſo deemed extinct, and if ſuch claim ſhall be made good, no Peer ſhall be created to ſupply the place of the next Peerage which may be deemed extinct, after ſuch claim being made good and eſtabliſhed. That all queſtions touching the election of Members to ſit on the part of Ireland in the Houſe of Commons of the united kingdom, ſhall be decided in the ſame manner as queſtions touching elections on the part of Great Britain now are, or at any time hereafter ſhall by law be decided, ſubject nevertheleſs to ſuch particular regulations in reſpect of Ireland, as from local circumſtances the Parliament of the ſaid united kingdom may from time to time deem expedient. That all qualifications as to property which are or ſhall be required by law of the Members elected on the part of England by counties, cities, or boroughs reſpectively, to ſit in the Houſe of Commons of the united kingdoms, ſhall be required of the Members to be hereafter elected to ſit therein on the part of Ireland for places of the like deſcription. That when his Majeſty, his heirs or ſucceſſors, ſhall declare his, her, or their pleaſure for holding the firſt or any ſubſequent Parliament of the united kingdom, a proclamation do iſſue under the Great Seal of the united kingdom, to cauſe the four Spiritual Lords and twenty-eight Temporal Peers, and one hundred Commoners who are to ſerve in the Parliament thereof on the part of Ireland, to be returned in ſuch manner as by an act of this preſent ſeſſion of the Parliament is or ſhall be ſettled; and that if his Majeſty, on or before the 1ſt day of January, 1801, on which day the Union is to take place, ſhall declare, under the Great Seal of Great Britain, that it is expedient that the Lords of Parliament of Great Britain, and Commons of the preſent Parliament of Great Britain, ſhould be the Members of the reſpective Houſes of the firſt Parliament of the united kingdom, for and on the part of Great Britain; then the ſaid Lords of Parliament of Great Britain, ſhall be the Members of the reſpective Houſes of the firſt Parliament thereof, for and upon the part of Great Britain. And his Majeſty may, by his royal proclamation, under the Great Seal of Great Britain, appoint the ſaid firſt Parliament of the united kingdoms of Great Britain and Ireland, to meet at ſuch time and place as his Majeſty ſhall think fit, and the 4 Spiritual Peers and 28 Temporal Peers, and 100 Commoners, who

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ſhall have been returned or elected to ſit in the firſt Parliament of the united kingdom, in the event of ſuch proclamation being iſſued as aforeſaid, in the manner which ſhall be preſcribed by an act of the preſent Seſſion of the Parliament of Ireland, for regulating the mode by which the Spiritual Lords and Temporal Peers and the Commons to ſerve in the Parliament of the united kingdom on the part of Ireland, ſhall be ſummoned or returned to the ſaid Parliament, ſhall be the Members of the reſpective Houſes of the firſt Parliament of the united kingdom on the part of Ireland, and the Lords of Parliament of Great Britain, and the four Spiritual Lords, and twenty-eight Temporal Peers of Ireland being ſummoned and returned as herein before provided, and the Members of the Houſe of Commons of the ſaid Parliament of Great Britain, and the hundred Members for Ireland, ſuch hundred Members being elected and returned as herein before provided, ſhall aſſemble and meet reſpectively in their reſpective Houſes of the Parliament of the united kingdom, at ſuch time and place as ſhall be ſo appointed by his Majeſty, and ſhall be the two Houſes of the firſt Parliament of the united kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and that Parliament may continue for ſuch time only as the preſent Parliament of Great Britain might have continued, if the Union of the two kingdoms had not been made, unleſs ſooner diſſolved by his Majeſty; and that every one of the Lords of Parliament of the united kingdom, and every Member of the Houſe of Commons of the united kingdom in the firſt and all ſucceeding Parliaments, ſhall take the oaths, and make and ſubſcribe the declarations which are at preſent by law enjoined to be taken, and made and ſubſcribed by the Lords and Commons of the Parliament of Great Britain, until the Parliament of the united kingdom ſhall provide otherwiſe, that the ſaid four Spiritual Lords to ſit in rotation of Seſſions, and the ſaid twenty-eight Temporal Peers to ſit for life in the Houſe of Lords of the Parliament of the united kingdom, ſhall have all privileges of Parliament, which the Spiritual and Temporal Peers of Great Britain reſpectively now have and which they or any Spiritual or Temporal Peer after the Union may enjoy, and the ſaid four Spiritual Lords and twenty-eight Temporal Peers ſhall have the ſame right of ſitting upon the trial of Peers as any other Spiritual Lords or Temporal Peers may enjoy; and in the caſe of the trial of any Peer during the adjournment or prorogation of Parliament, the ſaid twenty-eight Temporal Peers ſhall be ſummoned

moned in like manner, and have the ſame powers and privileges at ſuch trial as any other Spiritual Lords or Temporal Peers of the united kingdom; and that all Spiritual Lords of Ireland, and their ſucceſſors, ſhall have rank and precedency next and immediately after the Spiritual Lords of the ſame rank and degree of Great Britain; and that all Temporal Peers of Ireland ſhall, from and after the Union, have rank and precedency next and immediately after the Peers of the like orders and degrees in Great Britain at the time of the Union, and before all Peers of Great Britain who may be created after the Union, and ſhall be tried as Peers of Great Britain, and ſhall enjoy all privileges of Peers as fully as the Peers of England do now, or as any other Peers of Great Britain may hereafter enjoy the ſame, the right and privilege of ſitting in the Houſe of Lords, and the privileges depending thereon, and particularly the right of ſitting on the trial of Peers, excepted; and that all Peers for that part of the united kingdom called Ireland, created after the nion, ſhall have rank and precedency among the Peers of the united kingdom according to the dates of their creation, and enjoy all the privileges which may be enjoyed by the Peers of Ireland as herein above ſpecified and declared.

Art. 5.—Reſolved, That for the ſame purpoſe it would be fit to propoſe, that the Churches of that part of Gt. Britain called England, and of Ireland, ſhall be united into one Church, and the Archbiſhops, Biſhops, Prieſts, &c. of the Churches of England and Ireland, ſhall from time to time be ſummoned to, and entitled to ſit in Convocation of the United Church, in the like manner, and ſubject to the ſame regulations as are at preſent by law eſtabliſhed with reſpect to the like orders of the Church of England; and the doctrine, worſhip, diſcipline, and government of the ſaid United Church, ſhall be preſerved as now by law eſtabliſhed for the Church of England; and the doctrine worſhip, diſcipline, and government of the Church of Scotland, ſhall likewiſe be preſerved as now by law eſtabliſhed for the Church of Scotland.

Art. 6.—Reſolved 1ſt, That for the ſame purpoſe it would be fit to propoſe, that his Majeſty's ſubjects of Gt. Britain and Ireland ſhall, from and after the 1ſt day of January, 1801, be entitled to the ſame privileges, and be on the ſame footing as to encouragements and bounties on the like articles being the growth, produce, or manufacture of either kingdom reſpectively and generally, in reſpect of trade and navi-

gation, in all ports and places of the united kingdom, and its dependencies. And that in all treaties made by his Majeſty, his heirs, and ſucceſſors, with any foreign power, his Majeſty's ſubjects of Ireland ſhall have the ſame privileges, and be on the ſame footing as his Majeſty's ſubjects of Great Britain.

2. That from the ſaid firſt day of January, 1801, all prohibitions and bounties on the export of articles the growth, produce, or manufacture of either country to the other ſhall ceaſe and determine; and that the ſaid articles ſhall thenceforth be exported from one country to the other without duty or bounty on ſuch export.

3. That all articles the growth, produce, or manufacture of either kingdom, (not herein after enumerated as ſubject to ſpecific duties) ſhall from henceforth be imported into each country from the other free from duty, other than ſuch countervailing duty as is ſpecific in the Schedule No. 1, annexed to this article; and that the articles herein after enumerated ſhall be ſubject, for the period of 20 years from the Union, or importation into each country from the other, to the duties ſpecified in the Schedule No. 2, annexed to this article, viz. Apparel—Braſs, wrought—Cabinet Ware—Coaches—Copper, wrought—Cotton—Glaſs—Haberdaſhery—Hats—Hardware—Lace, Gold and Silver—Millinary—Paper, ſtained—Pottery—Sadlery—Silk manufacture—Steel—Stockings—and that the Woollen Manufactures ſhall pay, on importation into each country, the duties now payable on importation into Ireland.

Salt and Hops, on importation into Ireland, the duties which are now paid in Ireland; and Coals, on importation, be ſubject to the ſame burdens to which they are now ſubject.

4. That any articles of the growth, produce, or manufacture of either country, which are, or may be ſubject to internal duty, or to duty on the materials of which they are compoſed, may be made ſubject, on their importation into each country reſpectively from the other, to ſuch countervailing duty as ſhall appear to be juſt and reaſonable in reſpect of ſuch internal duty or duty on the materials: and that for the ſaid purpoſes the articles ſpecified in the ſaid Schedule No. 1. ſhould, upon importation into Ireland, be ſubject to the duty ſet forth therein, liable to be taken off, diminiſhed or encreaſed, in the manner herein ſpecified; and that upon the like export of the like articles from each country to the other reſpectively, a drawback ſhall be given equal in amount to the

countervailing

countervailing duty payable on the articles herein before ſpecified on the import into the ſame country from the other; and that in like manner, in future, it ſhall be competent to the united Parliament, to impoſe any new or additional countervailing duties, or to take off or diminiſh ſuch exiſting countervailing duties as may appear, on like principles, to be juſt and reaſonable in reſpect of any future or additional internal duty on any article of the growth, produce or manufacture of either country; or of any new or additional duty on any materials of which ſuch article may be compoſed, or of any abatement of the ſame; and that when any ſuch new or additional countervailing duty ſhall be ſo impoſed on the import of any article into either country from the other, a drawback, equal in amount to ſuch countervailing duty, ſhall be given in like manner on the export of every ſuch article reſpectively from the ſame country.

5. That all articles, the growth, produce, or manufacture of either kingdom, when exported thro' the other, ſhall in all caſes be exported ſubject to the ſame charges as if they had been exported directly from the country of which they were the growth, produce, or manufacture.

6 That all duty charged on the import of foreign or colonial goods into either country, ſhall, on their export to the other, be either drawn back, or the amount, if any be retained, ſhall be placed to the credit of the country to which they ſhall be ſo exported, ſo long as the general expences of the empire ſhall be defrayed by proportional contributions;—provided nothing herein ſhall extend to take away any duty, bounty, or prohibition which exiſt with reſpect to corn, meal, malt, flour, and biſcuit, but that the ſame may be regulated, varied, or repealed from time to time, as the united Parliament ſhall deem expedient.

Art. 7.—Reſolved, That for the ſame purpoſe it would be fit to propoſe, that the charge ariſing from the payment of the intereſt or ſinking fund for the reduction of the principal of the debt incurred in either kingdom before the Union, ſhall continue to be ſeparately defrayed by Great Britain and Ireland reſpectively.

the ſpace of 20 years after the Union ſhall take place, the contribution of Great Britain and Ireland reſpectively towards the expenditure of the united kingdom in each year, ſhall be defrayed in the proportion of fifteen parts for Great Britain, and two parts for Ireland. That at the expiration of the ſaid 20 years, the future expenditure of the united

ted kingdoms, other than the intereſt and charges of the debt incurred before the Union, ſhall be defrayed in ſuch proportion as the united Parliament ſhall deem juſt and reaſonable, upon a compariſon of the real value of the exports and imports of the reſpective countries, upon an average of the 3 years next preceding the period of reviſion, or on a compariſon of the value of the quantities of the following articles conſumed within the reſpective countries on a ſimilar average, viz. Beer—Spirits—Sugar—Wine—Tea—Tobacco—Malt—Salt and Leather—or according to the aggregate proportion reſulting from both thoſe conſiderations combined, or on a compariſon of the amount of income in each country, eſtimated from the produce for the ſame period, of a general tax if ſuch ſhall have been impoſed, on the ſame deſcriptions of income in both countries—and that the Parliament of the united kingdom ſhall afterwards proceed in like manner to reviſe and fix the ſaid proportions according to the ſame rules, or any of them, at periods not more diſtant than 20 years, nor leſs than 7 years, from each other, unleſs previous to any ſuch period, but ſubſequent to the 1ſt of January, 1821, the united Parliament ſhall have declared, as herein-after provided, that the general expences of the empire ſhall be defrayed indiſcriminately by equal taxes impoſed on the like articles in both countries.

That for the defraying the ſaid expences according to the rules above laid down, the revenues of Ireland ſhall hereafter conſtitute a conſolidated fund upon which charges equal to the intereſt of her debt and ſinking fund, ſhall in the firſt inſtance be charged, and the remainder ſhall be applied towards defraying the proportion of the general expence of the united kingdom to which Ireland may be liable in each year.

That the proportion of contribution to which Gt. Britain and Ireland will by theſe articles be liable, ſhall be raiſed by ſuch taxes in each kingdom reſpectively as the Parliament of the united kingdom ſhall, from time to time, deem fit: provided always, that in regulating the taxes in each country by which their reſpective proportion ſhall be levied, no article in Ireland ſhall be liable to be taxed to any amount exceeding that which will be thereafter payable in England on the like article.

That if at the end of any year any ſurplus ſhall accrue from the revenues of Ireland, after defraying the intereſt, ſinking fund, and proportioned contribution and ſeparate

charge

charges to which the ſaid country is liable, either taxes ſhall be taken off to the amount of ſuch ſurplus, or the ſurplus ſhall be applied by the united Parliament to local purpoſes in Ireland, or to make good any deficiency which may ariſe in her revenues in time of peace, or be inveſted by the Commiſſioners of the National Debt of Ireland, in the funds to accumulate for the benefit of Ireland, at compound intereſt, in caſe of her contribution in time of war, provided the ſurplus ſo to accumulate ſhall at no future period be ſuffered to exceed the ſum of five millions.

That all monies hereafter to be raiſed by loan, in peace or in war, for the ſervice of the united kingdom, by the Parliament thereof, ſhall be conſidered to be a joint debt, and the charges thereof ſhall be borne by the reſpective countries in the proportion of their reſpective contributions: Provided, that if at any time in raiſing the reſpective contributions hereby fixed for each kingdom, the Parliament of the united kingdom ſhall judge it fit to raiſe a greater proportion of ſuch reſpective contribution in one kingdom within the year than in the other, or to ſet apart a greater proportion of ſinking fund for the liquidation of the whole, or any part of the loan raiſed on account of the one country, than of that raiſed on account of the other country, then ſuch part of the ſaid loan, for the liquidation of which different proviſions have been made for the reſpective countries, ſhall be kept diſtinct, and ſhall be borne by each ſeparately, and only that part of the ſaid loan be deemed joint and common, for the reduction of which the reſpective countries ſhall have made proviſion in the proportion of their reſpective contributions.

If at any future day the ſeparate debts of each kingdom reſpectively ſhall have been liquidated, or the values of their reſpective debts (eſtimated according to the amount of the intereſt and annuities attending the ſame, of the ſinking fund applicable to the reduction thereof, and the period within which the whole capital of ſuch debt ſhall appear to be redeemable by ſuch ſinking fund) ſhall be to each other in the ſame proportion with the reſpective contributions of each kingdom reſpectively, or where the amount by which the value of the larger of ſuch debts ſhall vary from ſuch proportion, ſhall not exceed one hundredth part of the ſaid value; and if it ſhall appear to the united Parliament that the reſpective circumſtances of the two countries will thenceforth admit of their contributing indiſcriminately, by equal taxes impoſed on the ſame articles in each, to the future general expence of the

united

united kingdom, it ſhall be competent to the ſaid united parliament to declare that all future expences thenceforth to be incurred, together with the intereſt and charges of all joint debt contracted previous to ſuch declaration, ſhall be ſo defrayed indiſcriminately, by equal taxes impoſed on the ſame articles in each country, and thenceforth, from time to time, as circumſtances may require, to impoſe & apply ſuch taxes accordingly, ſubject only to ſuch particular exemptions or abatements in Ireland, and that part of Great Britain called Scotland, as circumſtances may appear from time to time to demand. That from the period of ſuch declaration it ſhall no longer be neceſſary to regulate the contribution of the two countries towards the future general expences according to any ſpecific proportion, or according to any of the rules herein before preſcribed; provided nevertheleſs, that the intereſt or charges which may remain on account of any part of the ſeparate debt with which either country is chargeable, and which ſhall not be liquidated or conſolidated proportionably as above, ſhall, until extinguiſhed, continue to be defrayed by ſeparate taxes in each country.

That a ſum not leſs than the ſum which has been granted by the Parliament of Ireland, on the average of the laſt ſix years, as premiums for the interual encouragement of agriculture or manufacture, or for the maintaining inſtitutions for pious and charitable purpoſes, ſhall be applied for the period of twenty years after the Union, to ſuch local purpoſes, in ſuch manner as the parliament of the united kingdom ſhall direct.

That from and after the firſt day of January, one thouſand eight hundred and one, all public revenue derived from the territorial dependencies of the united kingdom, ſhall be applied to the general expenditure of the empire, in the proportions of the reſpective contributions of the two countries.

Art. 8.—Reſolved, That for the ſame purpoſe it would be fit to propoſe, that all laws in force at the time of the Union, and all the Courts of Civil and Eccleſiaſtical Juriſdiction within the reſpective kingdoms, ſhall remain as now by law eſtabliſhed within the ſame, ſubject only to ſuch alterations or regulations, from time to time, as circumſtances may appear to the Parliament of the united kingdom to require, provided that all writs of error and appeals which may at preſent finally be decided by the Houſe of Lords of Ireland ſhall, from and after the Union, be decided by the Houſe of Lords of the united kingdom; and provided, that

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from and after the Union all Admiralty Jurisdictions be under the Lord High Admiral or Commissioners of the Admiralty of the united kingdom; and that all laws at present in force in either kingdom which shall be contrary to any of the provisions which may be enacted by any act for carrying these articles into effect, be from and after the Union repealed.

## SCHEDULE, No. 1.

Of the articles to be charged with countervailing duties upon importation into Great Britain and Ireland, respectively, according to the 6th Article of Union, to which this Schedule is annexed.

*Articles to be charged with a countervailing duty in Great Britain.*

Beer—Bricks and Tiles—Candles—Soap—Cordage—Printed Cottons—Cider—Glass—Leather—Paper, stained—Silk—Spirits—Starch—Sugar, refined—Sweets—Tobacco.

*Articles to be charged with a countervailing duty in Ireland.*

Beer—Glass—Leather—Paper, stained—Silk—Spirits—Sugar, refined—Sweets—Tobacco.

## SCHEDULE, No. 2.

Of the articles to be charged, with the duties specified upon importation into Great Britain and Ireland respectively, according to the sixth article of Union, to which this schedule is annexed—Apparel—Brass, wrought—Cabinet Ware—Coaches—Copper, wrought—Cotton—Glass—Haberdashery—Hats—Hardware—Lace, gold and silver—Millinery—Paper stained—Pottery—Sadlery and other manufactured Leather—Silk manufactures—Steel—Stockings, ten per cent. on the true value.

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